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 First holistic analysis of hydropower policy legitimation struggles in Myanmar 
 
 Contention is necessary to re-legitimize a failing hydropower policy regime 
 
 A weakened or disrupted policy regime yields new opportunities for reform  
 
 We recommend inclusive stakeholder deliberation and multi-objective planning 
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Large hydropower and legitimacy: a policy regime analysis, applied to Myanmar 
 
Abstract 
Hydropower development in capacity-constrained countries can unfold through unsound 
policy arguments, narrow institutional and implementing arrangements, and ad hoc decision 
making processes. To derive insights for more legitimate policy making, we provide the first 
holistic account of Myanmar’s legitimation struggles over large hydropower, focusing on 
Myitsone, the country’s most controversial dam, during the period 2003–2011. Our analysis 
takes a policy regime perspective (specifically, a “political economic regime of provisioning” 
framework). Among our findings: (1) frequent use of non-rationally persuasive argument 
among contending actors; (2) a spiral of declining policy legitimacy, which is amplified by 
civil society mobilization, and halted by a 2011 decision to suspend Myitsone; (3) rejection 
of Myitsone but conditional acceptance of large hydropower among some elements of civil 
society. Opportunity and capability for more technically informed, inclusive discussion exists 
in Myanmar, but given hydropower’s complexities, urgently deserves to be augmented. 
Although Myitsone in Myanmar is an exceptional case, we offer three propositions to assess 
and improve policy legitimacy of hydropower. 
 
Keywords: energy governance; hydropower; policy regime; gaining public acceptance; 
political ecology; Mekong 
 
1. Introduction 
How do developing countries legitimate large-scale energy infrastructure 
development? We engage with the above research question and profound governance 
challenge by exploring struggles over the legitimacy of a gigawatt-scale hydropower project 
*Revised Manuscript
Click here to view linked References
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in Myanmar, a least-developed country torn by decades of authoritarian rule and civil war. 
Since 2000, a number of generalized governance frameworks and guidelines have emerged 
which claim relevance to the hydropower sector. All emphasize legitimated development 
(e.g. Mekong River Commission et al., 2010; Natural Resources Governance Institute, 2014; 
World Commission on Dams, 2000). The most prominent of this normative governance 
literature is the WCD (2000), which considered “gaining public acceptance” as the first of its 
seven strategic priorities. WCD conceptualized public acceptance as an outcome of equitable 
decision making processes. Such processes include informed participation of involuntary 
risk-bearers, and agreements negotiated via accountable practices (2000: 215–220). 
Legitimate outcomes include fair benefit sharing, and sustained rivers and livelihoods (WCD 
2000: 234–243; Dore and Lebel, 2010).  
The legitimation of large energy projects has been difficult to achieve. The implied 
standards of governance demand a level of capability and responsiveness which many states 
do not have. Existing socio-political divisions may exacerbate unaccountable decision 
making. In poor developing countries the gap between governance principles and socio-
political reality can be significant. The WCD (2000) and related governance literature does 
not adequately deal with the question we raise, namely how, in specific low-capacity 
developing country contexts, “public acceptance” is to be improved.  
Answering the question of how developing countries legitimate large-scale energy 
infrastructure demands analysis of policy formation and implementation in specific settings. 
We focus on the case of Myitsone Dam in Myanmar’s northernmost Kachin State (named 
after the area’s predominant ethnic Kachin people) during 2003–2011. Myanmar’s 2011 
suspension of this contested $US3.6 billion energy project was unprecedented (Zhu et al., 
2016). Academic accounts focus on various facets relevant to legitimation, for example: 
activism (Simpson, 2013; Simpson, 2014);  Kachin and Burmese nationalist politics (Kiik, 
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2016b); the role of Chinese energy developers and Sino-Myanmar relations (Lamb and Dao, 
2017; Perlez, 2006; Sun, 2012; Yeophantong, 2016a, b), environmental and social safeguard 
norms (Kirchherr et al., 2016b; Kirchherr et al., 2017), perceptions of environmental risk and 
elite corruption (Kirchherr et al., 2016a) and the role of expert knowledge in decision making 
(Zhu et al., 2016). Such analyses illuminate a complex case and its context, while suggesting 
to us that a holistic analysis of hydropower legitimation challenges is timely.  
We offer a holistic account of the energy policy legitimation challenge in Myanmar. 
Taking a policy regime perspective (Foran et al., 2016; May and Jochim, 2013), we assess 
socio-technical contexts, policy arguments, institutional arrangements, and dynamics of 
support and opposition over time related to Myitsone Dam.  
Our account enhances the literature in several respects. First, since legitimation is 
historically- and culturally-structured, we argue that social historical approaches (e.g. Kiik, 
2016b) provide essential insights, complementing policy approaches which focus on 
contemporary governance practices (including social or environmental safeguards 
approaches). Thus we emphasize, among other dynamics, how Kachin civil society resistance 
against Myitsone is shaped by prior and ongoing interactions between the military-state and 
the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), the quasi-state that has governed large parts of 
the ethnic Kachin region since the 1960s (Section 7). 
Second, a topic of vital relevance to policy legitimation – yet under-explored in the 
Myitsone literature – is whether a particular project is the best energy services development 
option in a particular context (WCD, 2000). At critical moments, legitimacy may be more 
influenced by elite argumentation around such questions than historical or contemporary 
governance practice perspectives necessarily acknowledge.  Thus, we analyze how values 
and optimality are constructed and debated by Myitsone’s proponents and opponents, 
focusing on rational and non-rational persuasiveness.  
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Third, origins and impacts of civil society mobilization around Myitsone Dam are 
critical to understand (Chan, 2017; Kiik, 2016b; Kirchherr et al., 2017). Kachin and Burmese 
nationalisms were key drivers of mobilization which contributed to Myitsone’s 
(de)legitimation (Kiik, 2016b). Decisions not to heavily censor or detain critics facilitated 
anti-Myitsone opposition to emerge in lowland Myanmar in 2011 (Chan, 2017). Domestic 
opposition provided a bargaining position for Myanmar to revoke (not revise) an inter-state 
hydropower agreement (Chan, 2017); it was also a “root cause” for Chinese developers to 
adopt more rigorous social safeguard norms (Kirchherr et al., 2017: 535). Taking 
mobilization seriously, we conceptualize it as a process of interaction between challengers 
(e.g. anti-dam networks, armed ethnic organisations) and incumbents. Responding to 
perceptions of threat or opportunity, incumbents (e.g. state factions, developers, policy 
advisors) also engage in innovative action, changing structures of opportunity, with 
contingent outcomes (Chan, 2017; McAdam et al., 2001; Tilly, 1999). Such dynamics make 
unintended consequences inevitable.  
Section 2 introduces the conceptual framework, while Section 3 summarizes methods. 
Section 4 introduces Myanmar’s development context. Sections 5–7 unpack Myanmar’s 
policy regime around large hydropower. Section 8 discusses insights for hydropower policy, 
and Section 9 concludes. 
 
2. Conceptualizing legitimacy 
The concept of state legitimacy essentially refers to evaluations by citizens, expressed 
through actions and attitudes, that the state is meeting their reasonable interests. State 
legitimacy encompasses three interacting dimensions (Gilley, 2009):  
 legality (i.e. accountability to formalized rules and procedures);  
 citizen consent  
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
5 
 
 moral justification (i.e. the actions of authorities can be justified because they 
serve a shared understanding among citizens of the “common good” ) 
 
Although moral justification is central, in deeply divided societies such as Myanmar a shared 
understanding of the common good
1
 may not exist, making state legitimacy impossible by 
definition (cf. Gilley, 2009: 4–5). For us, this means that it is crucial to understand historical 
processes which enable or impede such shared understanding. 
Gilley’s (2009) conceptualization resonates with WCD (2000) and subsequent 
literature on the legitimation of large dams. Dore and Lebel (2010) argue that “gaining public 
acceptance” is an outcome of a dozen governance processes,2 but do not analyze real-world 
cases of legitimation. We approach legitimation through the concept of “policy regime”: the 
governing arrangements for addressing a policy problem or issue (May, 2015; May and 
Jochim, 2013). This approach draws on fundamental concepts such as actors’ interests, 
prevalent discourses, and institutions (Foran, 2006; Hajer, 1995; John, 1998; Lichbach and 
Zuckerman, 1997). Both interests and discourses drive politics but in a manner shaped by 
institutions. Discourses (e.g., specific models of economic development) can shape individual 
preferences. However, such models can be attacked for failing to resonate with an audience’s 
experience, its cultural beliefs, or empirical “facts”. Institutions reproduce legitimating 
practices yet they can be disrupted if their rationality is challenged often enough and loudly 
                                                 
1
 Defined as a citizen’s own fair share of the gains from social cooperation, as well as the reasonable demands of 
fellow citizens (Gilley, 2009). 
2
These processes map to dimensions of governance such as: representation, distribution of authority, 
institutional capacity, and downward accountability (Ratner et al., 2013).  
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enough by outside actors. Individuals can be threatened or persuaded to conform, but can also 
engage in collective action (e.g., advocacy networks) (Foran, 2006; 2015). 
A “policy regime” consists of a set of core arguments which represents the issue in a 
particular way; institutional arrangements that channel attention and resources to more or less 
effectively deal with the issue as defined; and different interest groups which support or 
oppose the governing arrangements as they unfold over time (May and Jochim, 2013). The 
concept emphasizes understanding the effectiveness of policy, once formulated, in governing. 
A legitimate regime achieves synergies between the core policy argument, effective 
institutional arrangements, net political support, and broad-based empowerment over time 
(May and Jochim, 2013). From this perspective, policy legitimacy means acceptance by the 
governed of the core policy arguments and institutional arrangements for resolving problems 
(May, 2015).  
2.1 Political economic regime of provisioning framework  
Emphasizing the need for greater critical contextualization, subsequent contributors 
proposed a “political economic regime of provisioning” (PERP) framework (Foran, 2015; 
Foran et al., 2016). The framework comprises topics relevant to an analysis of legitimation 
(Table 1). For example, it emphasizes the importance of natural resource-related capital 
accumulation, uneven development, and dispossession as sources of grievances, and hence 
potential catalysts of contention (Watts, 2012; Webber, 2012; Woods, 2011). 
<insert Table 1 about here>.  
Drawing from science and technology studies, the framework emphasizes the 
importance of mature technology and existing infrastructure in legitimizing particular 
conceptions (e.g. a centralized power generation system) of what is essential for energy 
provisioning (Fullbrook, 2016; Hennig, 2016; Smits, 2016).  
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
7 
 
Drawing on social movement studies, and critical realist methodology (Mayntz, 2004; 
Sayer, 1999), the framework treats social mobilization as a potentially robust social process – 
that is, a process whose internal mechanisms may be discerned across disparate social 
contexts, including extreme contexts such as Myanmar (McAdam et al., 2001). By 
mobilization, we mean a series of relational and discursive processes whereby actors 
conceive a threat (or opportunity) and begin to engage in innovative collective action, 
adapting existing organisational identities and structures to do so (McAdam et al., 2001). The 
interaction between challengers and incumbents – at times direct, always argumentative – 
results in contingent outcomes and potentially dynamic changes to the policymaking context 
(e.g. Chan, 2017).  
2.2 Analysis of argumentation  
Policy arguments, rules and practices (e.g. hydropower implementation practices) all 
make claims for collective action. We propose that they can be analysed as “practical 
arguments”. A practical argument involves: 
 
[T]he “weighing” of pros and cons . . . How well the claim for action is 
supported will depend on how a certain person will weigh [different considerations] 
together and how thoroughly and imaginatively she will explore as many relevant 
considerations as possible, including different and possibly conflicting goals, likely 
consequences, moral implications, different conceptualizations of the context of 
action . . .  
Fairclough & Fairclough (2012: 38) [emphasis added]. 
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Some arguments could be rationalizations, invoked to disguise decision makers’ 
actual motivations (Flyvbjerg, 1998). Nonetheless, since justification is integral to modern 
political legitimacy, tracing the structure and flow of such argument is relevant.   
Practical arguments consist of four components: (1) values, which are statements 
about what matters (or should matter) to an actor; (2) representations of the problem or issue; 
(3) goals, which are descriptions of desired future states, in which values are realized; and (4) 
means-goal arguments, i.e. arguments about how to move the situation from the problem (as 
represented) to the goal, in accordance with the actor’s values (Fairclough and Fairclough, 
2012). Topics such as effective institutional designs and implementation arrangements 
(Section 6) can be analyzed as means-goal arguments. Considering the four components 
explicitly allows different claims for action (such as building the Myitsone Dam, vs. an 
alternative energy project) to be compared and assessed from a variety of considerations. One 
important question is whether a course of action will have consequences that undermine its 
goal, or other collective goals (Section 7.3). 
2.2 Research questions 
How do developing countries legitimate large-scale energy infrastructure development? 
Addressing this central research question from a policy regime perspective and PERP 
framework leads us to ask:  
(a) In which development contexts is Myanmar’s large hydropower regime 
embedded? (Section 4) 
(b) What is the core policy argument in favour of large hydropower development? 
(Section 5) 
(c) What are the core institutional arrangements, and how effective are they at 
channelling resources and attention at addressing the issues framed by (b)? (Section 6) 
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(d) Given the development context, what dynamics of support or opposition ensue 
from attempts to implement (b), via (c)? (Section 7) 
(e) What implications follow for the development of legitimate hydropower policy 
regimes? (Section 8) 
 
3. Methods 
The analysis is a synthesis of diverse sources of evidence. Consistent with case study 
methodology (Yin, 2013), we used multiple sources of evidence, including data already 
published in other studies. In approximate declining order of importance for the analysis, the 
data used included: peer-reviewed publications, unpublished documents, news media reports, 
and interviews. We sourced literature relevant to exploring the Myitsone case from a policy 
regimes perspective – primarily English texts, supplemented by texts in Burmese and 
Chinese.
3
 Published literature was selected using several strategies. Using combinations of 
keywords “Myitsone” “legitimacy” and “hydropower” we searched Google Scholar and Web 
of Science for work published 1900–2017. We re-analyzed 14 interviews collected as part of 
two previous studies (Kiik, 2016b; Zhu et al., 2016), conducted two new key informant 
interviews (Appendix 1), and accessed useful unpublished material (e.g. Anonymous, 2012b; 
Limond and Aung, 2015). One co-author engaged in approximately 10 months of 
ethnographic fieldwork in Myanmar, between 2010 and 2015. The fieldwork covered topics 
relevant to socio-political contexts (Section 4), and dynamics of actor support and opposition 
to the Myitsone project (Section 7). Following ethics conventions in research involving 
human subjects, identities of individuals or groups are not disclosed.  
                                                 
3
Three co-authors have command of Burmese and/or Chinese. 
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We conducted a software-assisted, manual content analysis of the data. Themes used 
to structure the analysis are derived from the PERP framework (Table 1, second column). 
With respect to arguments (Section 5), we focused on those made by proponents, challengers, 
and knowledge brokers involved in the Myitsone case, reconstructing them based on the 
method of Fairclough and Fairclough (2012), based on reading of multiple texts. The 828-
page compilation of media accounts and reports by Snider (2012) was one useful source of 
arguments in favour of large hydropower in Myanmar during the early 2000s. 
Our analysis of institutional arrangements (Section 6) focused on those crucial for 
legitimacy in this context: processes for participation of involuntary risk-bearers, and 
outcomes such as benefit sharing and livelihood sustenance (Section 1). We also compared 
Myanmar’s institutional arrangements for independent power production with those of its 
Mekong neighbors (Foran et al., 2010; Molle et al., 2009; Suhardiman et al., 2011).  
To trace the dynamics of support and opposition to Myitsone and Myanmar’s large 
hydropower policy regime 2003–2011 (Section 7), we reviewed event chronologies (e.g. 
Anonymous, 2012a; Zhu et al., 2016) and directly relevant analyses (Chan, 2017; Kirchherr 
et al., 2016b; Zhu et al., 2016). We traced the chronological flow of arguments among actors, 
and tracked mobilizations. Lacunae in the data make our account of high-level decision 
making during the month September 2011 tentative (Section 7.2.2). Overall, however, the 
data allow a striking image to emerge of Myanmar’s large hydropower policy regime in the 
period 2003–2011, the focus of this paper. 
 
4. Development contexts 
Myanmar’s heterogeneous context includes a number of basic and formidable 
challenges (Jones, 2013; Kattelus et al., 2014; Zhu et al., 2016).  One challenge stems from 
tension between the central state’s interest in fast-tracking energy and resource development 
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projects, and its hitherto limited interest in inclusive, cross-sectoral planning. Political 
contention continues between central state and armed ethnic organisations in the periphery 
(Jones, 2014). The exploitation of natural resources in regions outside of the Burmese 
lowlands has long been an important source of power both for ethnic minority military-
political organisations and the central military-state. The central government’s reliance on 
resources stems from its relative ineffectiveness in raising revenue from broad-based 
strategies (Jones 2013). 
The rise of a new military government after 1988 led to increased projection of power 
into the periphery. Between 1988 and 2010, the size of the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Defence 
Services) approximately doubled. Armed ethnic opposition groups, losing support from 
resource-hungry China and Thailand were pressured into entering into ceasefire agreements, 
recognizing the territorial claims of the Myanmar government, in return for keeping control 
over certain territories, a share of development benefits, and the promise of future political 
dialogue (Callahan, 2007; Sadan, 2016). 
A second challenge stems from Myanmar’s rapid partial democratization (Zhu, et al. 
2016). In 2003, the military government began orchestrating a transition towards a quasi-
democracy, which led to a new constitution in 2008, and elections in 2010. The elections 
were widely assessed as neither free nor fair, resulting in a victory for the military-backed 
Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP). Although the military remained in control 
of the state apparatus, under President Thein Sein (a high-ranking general in the State Peace 
and Development Council [SPDC] regime) the government liberalized freedom of speech and 
association (including legal protest and demonstration); opened the economy to international 
firms and NGOs; and since 2012 allowed some parliamentary oversight of public projects 
(Maung Aung Myoe, 2013). Political liberalization in turn enabled greater civil society 
mobilization around protecting the Ayeyarwady [Irrawaddy] river against the Myitsone Dam 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
12 
 
without evident reprisal (Anonymous, 2012b; Simpson, 2013). In 2011, however, public 
university and government employees were discouraged from engaging in such mobilization 
(Interview Q). 
Myanmar’s power generation system at the end of 2008 – two years after proponents 
China Power Investment Corporation (CPI) signed an initial agreement to develop Myitsone 
– had a combined capacity of 2256 MW, 64% of which was from hydropower plant, 24% 
from gas turbine plant, and the remainder from thermal plant. At that time, the two largest 
plants in the system were Chinese-funded: 280MW Lower Paunglaung and 600MW Shweli-
1, completed in 2005 and 2009 respectively (Anonymous, 2008). Myitsone’s capacity, rated 
at 3600 MW in the mid-2000s – later revised to 6000 MW (Changjiang, 2010) – was 
sufficient to meet respectively 85% or 141% of projected domestic demand in 2020 
(Emmerton et al., 2015). Myitsone, like other contemporary projects in Myanmar’s North and 
East (Greacen and Palettu, 2007) was however designed to export the majority of its power 
through dedicated, to-be-built, high voltage lines. As a consequence of its focus on energy 
export, Myanmar has lagged notably in rural electrification compared to other developing 
countries (World Bank, 2011). In 2015, its 18% rural electrification rate among 18 
developing Asian countries exceeded only DPR Korea (IEA, 2016). Consumers outside 
Naypyidaw experienced frequent load shedding during the 2000s, and complained about 
inequities in access to reliable electricity (Hla Hla Htay, 2007; Perlez, 2006). In response, 
some consumers invested in solar PV systems and some communities (with NGO support) in 
pico-hydropower solutions. Beginning in 2015, some consultants to the Ministry of 
Agriculture promoted a vision of grid-connected, distributed generation (Fullbrook, 2016), 
based on expectations that costs of solar, wind and battery technology will continue to fall 
into the 2030s (CSIRO, 2013; IRENA, 2016). Zhu et al. (2016) summarize contending 
visions of Myanmar’s future electricity system as of the mid-2010s. 
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5. Policy arguments 
At the basis of the large hydropower regime in Myanmar lies the argument that in 
order to achieve economic development and modernization, specifically large export earnings 
and improved electrification, large dams for hydroelectricity export are necessary wherever 
feasible. Figure 1 summarizes this argument, which is constructed from analysis of Chinese 
Myitsone Dam proponents’ public discourse (Kiik, 2016b), Burmese media accounts of 
electricity development during the 2000s (Snider, 2012), and an interview with a large 
hydropower developer with experience in Myanmar (Interview L).  
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
The argument consists of a depoliticized combination of sub-arguments in which 
large storage-type hydropower serves as a technologically generic solution to meeting 
economically generic development objectives. Those objectives include export trade and 
improving supply to meet domestic needs. The argument is not unique to Myanmar – large 
storage dams are promoted using similar arguments in Nepal and in the Mekong region. Such 
arguments draw on a narrative which dominated twentieth century water resources 
development discourse, in which rivers harnessed for electricity generation constitute 
economic progress (McCully, 1996; Molle et al., 2009; Zhu et al., 2016).  
Figure 2 shows our reconstruction of Kachin civil society opponents’ arguments 
against Myitsone. In contrast with the proponents’ argument, which focuses on national and 
regional benefits in a depoliticized manner, the Kachin civil society opponents’ argument is 
explicitly politicized, with references to distributive justice (KDNG, 2007). The influence of 
the WCD (2000) framework can also be discerned (e.g. KDNG, 2007: 62–78).  The Kachin 
civil society opponents’ argument reveals a wider range of issues, ranging from locally-
specific values (e.g. livelihood and cultural preservation) to concerns about inter-ethnic 
peace-building in Myanmar. Later, as the scale of contention shifts to lowland Myanmar 
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(Section 7.2), anti-Myitsone arguments incorporate broader concerns, notably a Myanmar 
nationalist opposition to perceived Chinese domination of the economy. Both earlier and 
subsequent formulations invoke and contest the wider contexts in which Myanmar energy 
policy is embedded. 
<Insert Figure 2 about here> 
Arguments of Kachin activists against Myitsone Dam do not exhaust the 
developmental values and aspirations that can be found within Kachin society, the most 
pertinent of which are a strong desire for ethno-national political autonomy, as well as for 
modernity (the latter is represented in one instance as high-rise urban development) (Kiik, 
2016a). This combination of values helps explain why many Kachin actors oppose flooding 
the Myitsone site, framing it as an existential threat to the Kachin nation (Section 7), but do 
not reject all large-scale hydropower development (Figure 2). The KIO  in 2011 went so far 
as to argue that “we have no objection against the other six hydro plants” referring to the six 
other proposed dams in Figure 1 (KIO [Kachin Independence Organization], 2011). Various 
Kachin activists and civilians whom a co-author interviewed from 2010 to 2015 expressed 
similar sentiments.  
In 2011, after pro-river, anti-Myitsone mobilization emerges in urban lowland 
Myanmar, a debate about the pros and cons of Myitsone unfolded in different Burmese media 
outlets (Section 7). At this later date, proponents, notably, do not detail why Myitsone out-
ranks other large-scale power generation options. Based on sources available to the authors, 
which do not include any feasibility studies, we cannot construct a rationally persuasive 
argument for why Myitsone should be chosen above other energy generation options, 
including the six other gigawatt-scale alternatives to be developed by CPI as the upper 
Ayeyarwady “cascade” (summarized in Changjiang, 2010; Figure 3). Proponents (e.g. 
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Anonymous, 2011) rebutted arguments about the Myitsone site’s unsuitability but failed to 
establish the superiority of the Myitsone site over alternatives.
4
  
<insert Figure 3 about here> 
 
6. Institutional arrangements 
The most striking and consequential aspect of Myitsone’s institutional arrangements 
was the almost complete exclusion of all parties other than the project proponents and the 
Burmese and Chinese central governments from any significant aspect of project design and 
approval. Within Myanmar’s central government, the Ministry of Electric Power 1 was 
authorized to handle the proposal. Within MOEP 1, a deputy minister unsuccessfully 
proposed to Minister Zaw Min that to regulate flows it would be preferable to first build a 
hydropower dam upstream of the Myitsone site (Su Mon Thazin Aung, 2017: 126). 
Otherwise, sources available to us do not include any evidence of significant intra-
governmental debate, prior to proponents receiving approval in principle to proceed in 2006. 
Instead, allegations of corruption and opacity (Kirchherr et al., 2016a, 2016b) suggest to us 
that rent seekers facilitated approval.  
Importantly, the developers made no attempt to seek the explicit consent of project-
affected people or broader public. In line with its depoliticized issue representation (Section 
5), the developers adopted an explicitly “closed management” strategy. They implemented 
the project as if it were an “isolated island floating above the national soil of Burma,” as one 
Chinese state agency praised (Kiik 2016: 3-4). Such decisions assumed that Myanmar’s 
                                                 
4
 Evidence of value consists of action taken to build Myitsone first, as well as claims (which we cannot verify) 
that total project benefits would equal USD 54 Billion, of which the Myanmar partners would receive 60.7 
percent (Interview M). 
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SPDC military regime could suppress any opposition. At the time, the Myitsone confluence 
was controlled by the SPDC but most of the seven planned dams impinged upon the KIO 
territory. The relative exclusion of the KIO and the Kachin national public as beneficiaries 
exacerbated existing grievances (Section 7). 
The formal institutional arrangements followed the general structure of a 
(confidential) power purchase agreement from an independent power producer. Myanmar 
initiated such arrangements in the 1990s. In the case of Myitsone, they also involved the 
Myanmar government taking an equity role in the project company (Table 2). This particular 
arrangement can lead to conflicted interests: on the one hand, some organ of the state is a 
regulator, nominally in the public interest. On the other hand, the state investor is 
collaborating with private sector investors in a project company designed to generate a 
particular stream of financial benefits. If the regulatory commitment is weak, the investors’ 
interests may override the public interest (Foran et al., 2010). Myanmar’s contemporary lack 
of legal requirement for EIA exacerbated the conflict of interest. However, in a decision that 
partially mitigated the lack of third-party appraisal, the developer commissioned an EIA, 
conforming to commercial lenders’ expectations and also with domestic Chinese legislation.  
<insert Table 2 about here> 
As late as mid-2011, the USDP government appeared to believe that concern over the 
environmental and social impacts of Myitsone (e.g. as expressed by Kachin State MPs in 
March, and by Aung San Suu Kyi in July and August) could be mitigated by investing in 
“environmental conservation.” Some of these investments were discursive (name changes to 
particular state organisations) (Su Mon Thazin Aung, 2017: 128, 131). Other measures 
publicized by MOEP in August 2011 as “environmental conservation” include commitments 
to resettle displaced people with no adverse effects on social affairs. The fact that 
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resettlement had already resulted in significant adverse impacts (Section 7.2) was not 
acknowledged in such communication (cf. Anonymous, 2011). 
 
7. Dynamics of support and opposition  
Broadly speaking, the dynamics of interaction over the Myitsone project during the 
period 2003–2011 follow the pattern of:  
Implementation (of closed management model) → (Kachin anti-dam) 
mobilization → repression → scale shift → (multi-level anti- and pro-
dam) struggle → concession  
Italicized terms represent robust social processes (sensu McAdam et al., 2001). A similar 
pattern was found to recur in struggles over the approval, construction, and operation of 
Thailand’s most controversial dam (Foran, 2006; Missingham, 2003). Some scholars of 
contentious politics regard {mobilization →  struggle →  concession} dynamics as 
constitutive of democratization (McAdam et al., 2001).  
The concession consists of President Thein Sein’s 30 September 2011 decision to 
suspend the project during the period of his government. We defined mobilization in Section 
2. By repression, we mean any deliberate action by authorities or bystanders that increases 
the difficulties of collective action (e.g. violence, intimidation, inaction, media attacks) 
(Foran, 2006). 
As we describe below, beginning in 2009 the geographic and political scales of 
contention shift. Before 2010, anti-Myitsone contention was non-violent, taking the form of 
petitions, publications, and anti-dam graffiti, which the authorities ignore or repress through 
arrests of activists. After 2010, the contention intensified, involving forceful resettlement and 
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violence at the local level, the KIO’s more publicly declared opposition, followed by a 
resumption – for reasons beyond Myitsone – of armed conflict in June 2011 (Sadan, 2016). 
7.1 Mobilization and repression, 2003–2009 
Early attempts at anti-dam mobilization consist of several rounds of petitions, directed 
both at Kachin authorities and the military government. In 2003, Kachin church leaders in 
Tangphre village learn about dam construction plans and in early 2004 write letters of 
concern, without reply from Burmese authorities, nor from the KIO (Kiik, 2016b). 
The position of the KIO with respect to Myitsone deserves analysis. Like other quasi-
state organisations, the KIO has interests in natural resources extraction and trade (Jones 
2014), as well as in hydropower projects supplying electricity to state capital Myitkyina 
(population 307,000) (Transnational Institute, 2011). The KIO’s relations with the Myanmar 
and Chinese states reflect a complex political geography (Dean, 2005). Due to political, 
military, and business considerations, the KIO cannot easily oppose a Chinese hydropower 
project in the Kachin region.
5
 KIO’s opposition to the Myitsone Dam seems to largely stem 
from increasing responsiveness to Kachin social leaders and public (Interview D). 
The KIO – an organisation with approximately 10,000 soldiers – stands to benefit 
economically from a peace agreement with Myanmar, which would allow it to tax and trade 
legitimately. In February 1994, the military government signed a ceasefire agreement which 
recognized KIO’s claim to large territories in ethnic Kachin areas (Dean, 2005). During the 
1994–2011 ceasefire period, the KIO assumes the role of a responsible, peace-making state. 
For example, it keeps the ceasefire despite incidents of torture and murder perpetuated 
against its soldiers in 2001–06 (Ba Kaung, 2011), and participates in a lengthy process to 
                                                 
5
 As evidenced in diplomatically-worded letters objecting to Myitsone, written to Yunnan Province authorities 
in 2007 and to the Chinese Premier in 2011 (KIO, 2011). 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
19 
 
draft the 2008 Constitution. Yet, it loses much Kachin popular legitimacy because of its 
leaders’ perceived business corruption and cooperation with the reviled Burmese junta, only 
regaining it during the lead-up to war in 2011 (Sadan, 2016). During this period, the KIO’s 
position with respect to Myitsone is cooperative and restrained.  
Anti-Myitsone mobilization within broader Kachin society however gradually forms 
in the mid-2000s, taking the form of petition campaigns and reports compiled by activists 
based on underground research (Kiik, 2016b, Kirchherr, 2016b). An anti-dam storyline 
circulates through church and activist organisations, in Kachin society and outside Myanmar. 
In the following years, the project is increasingly opposed as another example of large-scale 
resource grabbing and social injustice, creating an altogether existential threat (Kiik, 2016a). 
These concerns are echoed in a 2007 letter from a group of Kachin elders to General Than 
Shwe, head of the SPDC government:  
The Irrawaddy River is the heart of Burma flowing from north to 
south . . . rich in heritage forests and natural resources. The Irrawaddy 
offers survival to the Kachin people as well as to the Burmese people. 
The Burmese people must preserve the valuable natural resources and 
cultural heritage of the Irrawaddy . . . for new generations.  
(KDNG 2007, emphasis added) 
The letter argues that small-scale dams are sufficient for local development, and many 
different electricity generation options exist for Kachin State.  Soon, the KIO also 
communicates that it opposes building a dam at the Myitsone confluence, while supporting 
hydropower development elsewhere, in letters to Yunnan authorities and to the head of the 
SPDC government. During 2007 and after, Kachin anti-dam activists collect signatures 
against the dam. In two instances, student activists spray-paint or post strong anti-dam 
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messages in public spaces (KDNG 2007, 2009). However, the SPDC government meets these 
acts with sporadic arrests. No state authority, including the KIO, takes action to halt the 
project. 
7.2 Scale shift, struggle and concession, 2009–2011  
By 2009–2010, a series of developments at project-level and at regional and national 
levels combines to shift the geographic and political scales of the anti-Myitsone mobilization. 
At the project level, in 2009 the number of workers increases notably at Myitsone and related 
sites. Some 100 experts from several institutes hired by CPI complete field investigations for 
an EIA study. The Burmese partner, Biodiversity and Nature Conservation Association 
(BANCA), submits a report highly critical of the Myitsone project (Section 7.2.1). In 2011, 
this report is leaked and published online. Meanwhile in April 2010, a series of small bomb 
blasts occurs near the dam construction site, including Asia World offices and injuring at 
least one Chinese worker.
6
 The Burmese military responds by violence against local villagers. 
Soon after, developers begin to implement a program of involuntary resettlement with 
compensation. Four villages are relocated to the first resettlement village, followed by 
pressure on the area’s largest village (Tanghpre) to move to a second resettlement site. Kiik 
(2016b: 4) describes this resettlement as “a largely violent displacement of 2000 people.” 
Kachin villagers and organisations reported difficulty accessing suitable agricultural land, 
and theft of compensation money paid by CPI (Anonymous, 2012a; Kiik, 2016b; Limond and 
Aung, 2015).  
With limited connections to Kachin campaigners, some Burmese activists in lowland 
Myanmar begin to oppose the Dam. The repressive context inhibits direct conversation about 
the Dam, so they target it indirectly by highlighting the Ayeyarwady River.  They organize 
                                                 
6
 Some sources state that four workers were killed (Yeophantong, 2016a), however others claim no casualties.   
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
21 
 
photography exhibitions and publish books celebrating the river and its significance for 
livelihoods and culture (Anonymous, 2012b; Kiik, 2016b). 
The intensification of anti-dam resistance, and its diversification in the form of 
linkages with Burmese activism, unfolds in a context of heightened political contention in 
Myanmar. In April 2009 the military government demands that ethnic armed groups 
transform into “Border Guard Forces” under Tatmadaw control. The KIO and almost all 
major armed groups in eastern Myanmar resist. In 2009, the Tatmadaw attacks and overruns 
the Kokang, one of the smaller groups, and in 2010, annuls the non-complying organisations’ 
ceasefire agreements, putting particular pressure on the KIO. The KIO’s candidates are 
barred from the 2010 elections. The NLD boycotts the elections over restrictions imposed by 
the military on their eligibility to participate. While marred by allegations of vote rigging, the 
elections lead to the formation of a USDP government headed by Thein Sein.  
The aftermath of these developments sees armed conflict resume in Kachin State in 
June 2011, rupturing the ceasefire agreement of 1994. Provocations by the Northern 
Command of the Tatmadaw leads to fighting in contested territory around the 240 MW 
Dapein-1 hydropower dam (completed in February 2011) and the proposed Dapein-2 dam 
downstream. Located approximately 150 km south of the Myitsone site, part of Dapein-1’s 
power is allocated to a Chinese-owned nickel mine and smelter (Burma Rivers Network 
2010). The KIO no longer allows the Myitsone project’s supply trucks access to the 
construction site, key bridges are blown up, and construction halts. (The fighting has 
continued and spread, with >100,000 people in the Kachin region displaced into crowded 
camps as of 2017).  
The rise of Myammar’s first quasi-civilian government in decades however ushers in 
expanded political opportunities, particularly for urban Burmese civil society. Initially, civil 
society activists had low confidence in the military's willingness to tolerate significant reform 
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(Chan, 2017). However, the SPDC began to release political prisoners, including Aung San 
Suu Kyi, in late 2010, and as noted above, in 2011 Thein Sein's government relaxes media 
censorship, and liberalized freedom of association. 
In this context, a “Save the Ayeyarwady” movement emerges among the Burmese 
activist, environmental, and cultural elite. Building on field trips to Kachin state which began 
around 2009 (Anonymous, 2012b, Chan, 2017), parts of ethnic Kachin and Burmese civil 
society actors interact informally in an explicit attempt to resist what both the Kachin and 
Burmese activists regard as an existential threat to their peoples, to oppose the elite and 
foreign beneficiaries of the project, and for some activists, to try to construct an inter-ethnic 
movement for peace (Kiik, 2016b:11). Crucially, the lowland Myanmar campaign is driven 
by a narrative of existential threat to the people of Myanmar by Chinese colonialism (Kiik, 
2016b; Lamb and Dao, 2017; Min Zin, 2012). 
By August 2011, a heterogeneous pro-river, anti-dam coalition emerges in Myanmar. 
In addition to the KIO, new actors to mobilize include incoming Kachin MPs unaligned with 
the KIO and a broad range of Burmese activists and intellectuals. The fear of repression leads 
activists to organize non-confrontational literary and artistic events, which surprisingly, 
attract hundreds of people, including celebraties: 
[A]rt shows . . . became a key vehicle for the campaign . . . [they 
received] up to 5,000 people in August and September 2011, and 
increasingly moved from focusing on protecting ‘water sources’ to 
‘Stop the Dam’. In a daring move, in September 2011, exhibition 
organisers invited the country’s most famous activists, entertainers, 
models and music stars to the opening of an art exhibition in Yangon. 
About half of the invitees turned up . . . [and] were requested to 
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feature with hand written signs [such as] ‘stop the dam’, ‘protect our 
river.’ (Anonymous 2012b) 
 
7.2.1 Two smaller dams: the contribution of expert knowledge. Scholarship on the politics of 
Myitsone dam has to some extent neglected the contribution of expert knowledge. As we 
show, the arguments of certain knowledge brokers influenced policy discourse around the 
project. In early 2008, CPI commissioned an Environmental Impact Assessment. It hired 
Changjiang Survey, Planning, Design and Research Corporation (herein, “Changjiang”) to 
manage the EIA contract. Myanmar’s Biodiversity and Nature Conservation Association 
(BANCA) was the senior Myanmar partner on the study. BANCA is a non-profit, non-
aligned professional environmental NGO. Its report was later incorporated – in a heavily 
censored form – into an EIA document including contributions from Chinese institutes with 
hydrological or environmental remits (Changjiang 2010).  
The BANCA (2009) report consists of a three-part environmental baseline study and 
biological impact assessment. While disclaiming that it is not a comprehensive impact 
assessment, the text is remarkable for arguing against hydropower development in the upper 
Ayeyarwady basin (Zhu et al., 2016). BANCA (2009) warns against the “unplanned and 
environmentally naive” pace of development in Myanmar (p. xxiii), and notes that the seven 
upper Ayeyarwady projects impact on a globally significant biodiversity hotspot, with 
impacts extending downstream to the delta (p. 2, 21, 36). Drawing explicitly from WCD 
publications, BANCA recommends inter alia, that decision makers distinguish 
environmentally friendly vs. threatening dams; assist affected people for up to ten years, and 
direct 1% of hydropower revenues to watershed protection and two new national parks 
(10,894 km
2
) (2009: 22, 60–3, 78).  
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Most notably, BANCA (2009) recommends avoiding a dam at the Myitsone site 
because of its irreplaceable cultural significance to the Kachin, and recommends instead 
construction of two upstream dams: 
The best option would be . . . to develop two smaller hydropower 
dams . . . at appropriate two locations above the [Myitsone] 
confluence rivers . . . If Myanmar and Chinese sides were really 
concerned about environmental issues and aimed at sustainable 
development of the country, there is no need for such a big dam to be 
constructed . . . Instead two smaller dams could be built above 
Myitsone to produce nearly the same amount of electricity.  
BANCA (2009: 41–2; emphasis added) 
 
At first glance BANCA (2009) appears to mediate between the arguments of the anti-
dam and pro-dam coalitions. It rejects the Myitsone site as unacceptable and warns against 
the dam’s negative ecological effects” However, it accepts the value of large hydropower, in 
the form of two unspecified smaller dams producing “nearly the same amount of electricity.”  
A Myanmar-based researcher told us that BANCA had identified several alternatives.  
We sighted an unpublished report with two alternative sites upstream of Myitsone, one on the 
N’Mai Kha, the other on the Mali Kha. Together, they would inundate a total of 118 km2, 
including 16 villages, compared to Myitsone’s 405 km2 footprint and 32 villages to be 
inundated. Changjiang (2010) however rejected the proposal, and BANCA’s final report 
(BANCA, 2009) did not identify the two alternatives (Interview Q). 
Changjiang’s EIA report (2010) did not include any argument that better alternatives 
to Myitsone might exist. Changjiang stated that its EIA was conducted in accordance with 
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World Bank guidelines, including Bank policies around involuntary resettlement and 
indigenous peoples (2010: 3). A subsequent review of the EIA however found numerous 
shortcomings against best practices (International Rivers, 2013), including lack of authentic 
consultation with local communities (Kirchherr et al., 2016b). One expert described the 
BANCA (2009) report as “totally neglected” by Changjiang (International Rivers 2013: 17). 
By September 2011, the EIA process under Changjiang’s control drew repeated criticism 
inside Myanmar (Wai Moe, 2011; Zhu et al., 2016). In any case, the two smaller dams 
argument from Myanmar knowledge brokers appears to have influenced elite arguments over 
the case in 2010–11. 
7.2.2 Argumentative struggle and concession. The period from mid-2011 to the President’s 
concession in September is marked by an increase in argumentative struggle in the mass 
media, and notable elite divisions. As late as July 2011 (a month after the resumption of 
conflict disrupts access to the site), the President appears to consider the project viable (Su 
Mon Thazin Aung, 2011: 130). As noted in Section 6, the core executive appears to believe 
that concern over the impacts of Myitsone could be mitigated by social and environmental 
programs approved by the government. 
Responding to the increased volume of anti-dam, pro-river coverage in private media 
outlets such as the Eleven Media Group, the state-owned New Light of Myanmar publishes in 
early August two more technical articles promoting the project’s design, its ecological 
impacts, and its overall net benefits (Anonymous, 2011; Kyaw Min Lu, 2011). The same 
week, citing the BANCA (2009) EIA report, Aung San Suu Kyi calls for a reassessment of 
the scheme, and endorses a campaign to save the Ayeyarwady (Aung San Suu Kyi, 2011). 
Pro-dam arguments harden. On 10 September, the Minister of Electric Power 1 Zaw Min 
gives a press conference, stating that: 
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some people are suffering from the currently popular ‘Irrawaddy 
disease . . . We will never backtrack from this project . . . spoiling 
[Myitsone] in the pretext of environmental issues will undermine the 
interest of our country. We can achieve nothing from this. It’s very 
simple. The country will get 10 per cent free power and 8 per cent 
commercial tax from this project  . .  .  
(Mizzima, 2011; emphasis added) 
The Minister discloses that he authored a recent anonymously-written article 
defending Myitsone’s merits (i.e. Anonymous, 2011). Defending technocracy, he 
states no one in the country is “smarter than him in hydropower generation” 
(Mizzima, 2011). Similar claims about technical expertise and the public’s 
inability to understand relevant issues are made by a senior member of the 
electric power ministry (Ko Pauk, 2011). Critics rebut Zaw Min’s claims, arguing 
that the national interest lies in the perpetual survival of the river. They predict 
street demonstrations will follow (Mizzima, 2011). Six days later, U Myint, a 
well-known economist recruited to a senior advisory post, issues an open letter 
calling for a credible analysis of the project. He invokes the two smaller dams 
argument previously voiced by BANCA (2009).  
[W]e should conduct an objective and independent economic and 
social impact analysis of the Myitsone dam project . . . The possibility 
of a suitable alternative, such as building two small dams upstream 
that will yield the same amount of electricity could also be 
considered. Such an alternative, while bringing the same economic 
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benefits, will have much less adverse economic, social, political and 
emotional impacts on the people of Myanmar . . . 
(Anonymous 2012a:148, emphasis added) 
 
Within days of the above argumentative struggles, the government holds a workshop 
in Naypyidaw, which brings together high-level government officials, CPI, some civil society 
organisations, and journalists to discuss and debate the project (Wai Moe, 2011). If Save the 
Ayeyarwady launches the first “real national debate” in Myanmar in decades (International 
Crisis Group, 2011: 9), the 17 September workshop is possibly the first real attempt at public 
deliberation on hydropower. The arguments made there (Zhu et al., 2016; Chan, 2017; Su 
Mon Thazin Aung, 2017) reveal some senior government officials echoing opponents’ 
arguments, representing Myitsone as a threat to Myanmar’s ecology and society, and notably 
invoking the opponents’ argument that alternative sites superior to Myitsone existed. 
 After the workshop, with ministerial divisions now evident, Minister Zaw Min is 
asked to devise a process, whereby parliament will decide on the project after two levels of 
specialists offer submissions (Su Mon Thazin Aung, 2017: 137). However, on 29 September 
2011 (two days after Zaw Min’s proposal) the President reportedly has a meeting with senior 
advisors from academia and think tanks who warn him of various “irreparable impacts” 
(Yeophantong, 2016b). He is described as being under “great pressure” during this time 
because of anti-Dam opposition (Chan, 2017), and increasingly receptive to arguments made 
by Soe Thein, Minister of Industry, to cancel or suspend the project (Su Mon Thazin Aung, 
2017). Subsequently on 29 September, the President announces a decision to suspend 
Myitsone Dam at a ministerial meeting (Su Mon Thazin Aung, 2017). The President’s 
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subsequent announcement to parliament is not communicated in advance to CPI or Beijing 
(Chan, 2017). 
7.3 Presidential speech analysis 
We interpret the policy argument in the President’announcement of 30 September 
2011 (New Light of Myanmar, 2011) as follows. The speech’s underlying values are 
“democratic practices”, “good governance”, and “environmental conservation.” Myanmar’s 
goals are “peace and stability of the State” and national modernization. Issue representations 
include active peace-making efforts; electricity as essential for industrialization; the 
inadequacy of nuclear and coal-fired technologies; the inadequacy of natural gas under 
current arrangements (which privilege foreign investors); the availability of renewable 
hydropower energy; and a 30-year strategic plan for electricity with 64 planned hydropower 
projects, including eight upper Ayeyarwady projects (Figure 3). In the speech, this brief 
reference to upper Ayeyarwady hydropower has the rhetorical effect of valuing the cascade 
scheme. However, Chinese implementation of the Myitsone project is then described as 
causing a wide array of “public concerns” (New Light of Myanmar, 2011). The “people’s 
will” is that the cons of the project outweigh the pros. The conclusion is a claim for action to 
suspend the project:  
As our government is elected by the people, it is to respect the 
people’s will. We have the responsibility to address public concerns 
in all seriousness. So construction of Myitsone Dam will be 
suspended in the time of our government [i.e. to the end of 2015]. 
Other hydropower projects that pose no threat will be implemented 
through thorough survey for availability of electricity needed for the 
nation. . .  
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(New Light of Myanmar, 2011; emphasis added) 
 
The President’s argument builds on common values of electrification and modernity. 
However, the proponents’ value of depoliticized political order (Figure 1) is notably re-cast 
as order based on democratic legitimacy. Issue representations include first pros of upper 
Ayeyarwady development, then cons consisting of opponents’ concerns. By explicitly 
acknowledging proponents’ pros and opponents’ cons, the issue representation is more 
balanced than either the proponents’ or opponents’ arguments we reconstructed (Figures 1 
and 2). The means-goal argument is to implement other hydropower projects to meet 
Myanmar’s electricity needs (as opposed to predominately for export) thus delivering on the 
combined goals of modernization, with peace and stability. 
After this landmark decision, CPI and the Chinese government engage in various 
strands of advocacy and diplomacy aimed at persuading Myanmar civil society and 
government actors to re-consider their positions against the project (Chan, 2017; Kiik, 2016b; 
Zhu et al., 2016). Civil society representatives express frustration at the proponents’ 
continued interest in Myitsone, without heeding the voices of local people, at a time of 
intensified suffering in Kachin (Interviews A, D, E). 
 
8. Discussion 
Although vitally relevant, the World Commission on Dams (2000) and other 
normative governance approaches were not designed to explore the actual dynamics which 
de-legitimate or legitimate energy development. What insights, then, does Myanmar provide? 
Some readers may regard Myitsone in Myanmar as too exceptional a case and context from 
which to glean general insights. We nonetheless offer three initial propositions:  
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
30 
 
(P1) Three processes – heightened public contention, elite 
intervention, and persuasive argument – are necessary to disrupt a 
cycle of declining policy legitimacy;  
(P2) A weakened or disrupted policy regime expands opportunity to 
critique its dynamics; 
(P3) The reform of a hydropower policy regime requires a multi-
disciplinary set of capabilities, and supportive institutional 
arrangements. 
 
8.1 Disrupting a failing policy regime 
Our analysis of Myanmar’s Myitsone project to 2011 reveals a spiral of declining 
legitimacy of large hydropower – or to put it starkly, a failing policy regime (Sections 5–7). 
To recap: proponents’ failure to defend Myitsone’s superiority over other hydropower sites 
and other energy service options weakened their policy argument (Section 5). Their failure to 
discuss a range of alternatives resulted in an asymmetrical contest between a means – a 
hydropower dam – vs. a persuasive argument about ends, namely that the confluence site and 
the Ayeyarwady, as emblems of ethnic and national identity, and icons of heritage, should be 
preserved. Myitsone’s institutional arrangements were inadequate (Section 6). Arrangements 
between proponents and the central government did not properly recognize Kachin State’s 
dominant political actor (the KIO), civil society groups, or the broader population. Control 
over EIA findings by Changjiang, a party with conflicted interests, resulted in a lack of 
rigorous environmental and social assessment (Section 7.2.1).  
Regarding the dynamics of support and opposition: the proponents’ unpersuasive 
policy argument (Figure 1), combined with remarkably inadequate institutional and 
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implementing arrangements, caused grievances to accumulate among Kachin and later wider 
Burmese civil society. By 2011, the project coincided with Myanmar’s emerging political 
transformation. As restrictions on freedom of expression began to ease, “saving the 
Ayeyarwady” became a cause unifying nationalist publics and a civil society seeking peace 
and socially inclusive development, against foreign commercial interests in a mega-project. 
The emergence of multi-level mobilization was not pre-destined. Instead it hinged on the 
critical arguments of Kachin villagers and leaders, amplified and reframed by lowland 
Myanmar advocates (Section 7). To dissipate political impacts that had already emerged, and 
foreseeable domestic social and political damage, a newly elected, nominally-civilian 
government withdrew its support. In so doing, it disrupted Myanmar’s large hydropower 
policy regime. The case leads directly to the proposition that heightened public contention, 
elite intervention, and persuasive argument are necessary to disrupt a cycle of declining 
policy legitimacy. 
8.2 Critiquing a policy regime 
Our second proposition is that a weakened or disrupted policy regime offers enhanced 
opportunity to critique its performance. Section 7.2 showed the emergence of more elaborate 
as well as passionate anti- and pro-dam arguments during 2009–2011. Some arguments 
heightened perceptions of policy illegitimacy. For example, a minister’s charged statements 
during the second week of September 2011 (Section 7.2.2) triggered categorical rebuttals by 
anti-dam spokespeople (Mizzima 2011) a week before the “climax” of the Save the 
Ayeywarwady campaign (Anonymous 2012b; Chan 2017: 9). 
Elite actors also contributed to regime critique. After the 2011 decision, the Thein 
Sein government invited CPI to develop the six other upper Ayeyarwady sites (Figure 3). CPI 
declined. We interpret its position – that no guarantee existed an alternative dam could avoid 
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conflict and move to completion (Zhu et al., 2016) – not only as an acknowledgement of 
ongoing hostilities, but indirectly, as a rebuke of the policy regime’s institutional 
arrangements (Section 6). 
Likewise, following a series of Myistone-related meetings with Myanmar civil society 
and government in early 2012, a Chinese vice-minister admitted the difficulty of monitoring 
and regulating state-owned enterprises such as CPI (Yeophantong, 2016a: 134).  Another 
moment of policy regime critique occurs when the NLD’s 2015 election manifesto endorses 
solar and wind energy technologies over large hydropower (National League for Democracy, 
2015).  
We interpret the 20-member “Myitsone Commission” established by the NLD 
government in August 2016, as a possible further instance of regime critique. Chaired by the 
Deputy Speaker of the Lower House, and comprised of officials and experts in a range of 
disciplines (Interview Q), the commission is tasked to assess hydropower proposals on the 
Ayeyarwady against international standards. Its terms of reference and methods have not 
been published. However, the commission’s intention to incorporate the “voices and 
concerns” of local communities into its recommendations (Nyein Nyein, 2016) appears to 
repudiate the closed institutional arrangements of the Myitsone project.  
8.3 Capability and institutional requirements 
Our third proposition – that reform of a hydropower policy regime requires a multi-
disciplinary set of capabilities, and supportive institutional arrangements – arises from the 
diversity of substantive issues raised by hydropower, the scope of analysis demanded by 
regime perspectives (Section 2), as well as the difficulty would-be reformers face to gain 
recognition. 
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Myanmar’s capability for more holistic assessment of hydropower (e.g. BANCA, 
2009, and the 17 September 2011 workshop) deserves to be augmented and supported with 
institutional arrangements. For example, a combination of institutional (Changjiang’s control 
of the EIA process), and capacity-related challenges (the deaths during 2011 of two senior 
BANCA staff with specific knowledge) appears to have resulted in BANCA’s version of the 
“two smaller dams argument” not being published. Deliberation around whether it is actually 
possible to generate “nearly the same amount” of electricity while avoiding the worst 
ecological and social impacts, remains to be pursued. Hydropower-related issues for actors to 
deliberate on include ecological connectivity for biodiversity and livelihood security (Ansar 
et al., 2014; ICEM, 2010; Ziv et al., 2012), and alternative energy development scenarios for 
Myanmar (e.g., Emmerton et al., 2015; Fullbrook, 2016; WWF et al., 2016), some of which 
have been offered by reformers. Deliberation may possibly be supported by multi-objective 
techniques (The Nature Conservancy et al., 2016). However, given technical complexity and 
risk of technocratic dominance, arrangements conducive to multi-stakeholder participation 
are required. 
8.4 Legitimizing energy policy regimes 
Despite largely sharing values around material modernity, Myitsone’s proponents and 
opponents differ significantly on other values. The 2011 decision did not alter the positions of 
senior officials who support the project (Interviews F & I), and the two sides talk and act past 
each other (Interviews A, D, E). A challenge for policy entrepreneurs is whether deliberative, 
multi-stakeholder processes (e.g. Kowalski et al., 2009) can bring citizens closer to a shared 
understanding of the “common good” around energy development in Myanmar (cf. Gilley, 
2009a). 
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We propose that a shared understanding is advanced first by rationally persuasive 
hydropower-related argument. Second, it is advanced by effort to select projects based on 
transparent and multi-attribute comparison with hydropower alternatives (The Nature 
Conservancy et al., 2016) and with other means to deliver energy services (Fullbrook, 2016) 
and achieve inclusive development. Third, it is advanced by recognizing and incorporating 
peoples’ preferences for social and ecological sustainability into project designs. Fourth, 
implementers will need to provide affected people with considerably greater benefits 
(Kirchherr et al., 2016a). Such a regime is unlikely to systematically favour large projects 
with inherently high demands on institutional capacity, and complex impacts and risks for 
communities, developers and societies. 
 
9. Conclusion 
We applied a policy regime perspective (specifically, a political economic regime of 
provisioning framework, PERP) to explore the dynamics of large hydropower legitimation in 
a developing and civil war-torn country context. We analyzed the persuasiveness of policy 
argument; the adequacy of key institutional arrangements; and the dynamics of actor support 
and opposition, which unfolded in a complex political economic context. In so doing, we 
demonstrated the importance and feasibility of seeking a holistic understanding of energy 
policy legitimation, and the utility of a PERP framework for such analysis. 
Much remains to be understood about the Myitsone project, and its implications for 
energy policy legitimation in Myanmar. The 2011 suspension of Myitsone Dam disrupted the 
declining legitimacy of Myanmar’s large hydropower policy regime. Despite the challenges 
of political economy and path dependency, the 2011 suspension may offer opportunities to 
work towards a more legitimate energy policy regime. Such opportunities include 
recognizing new actors and perspectives in Myanmar energy policy that have emerged since 
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2011; regarding social mobilization around Myitsone and other energy projects as feedback 
on policy legitimacy; and engaging citizens in the process of crafting more rationally 
persuasive arguments around energy options. 
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Table 1 Political economic regime of provisioning 
Dimension Selected Themes 
(1) Political economic context of 
(energy) development: 
 
(1.1) Prevailing social relations 
 
 
 
(1.2) Patterns and vectors of 
resource and energy flows 
 
 
 
 
 
(1.3) Material infrastructure 
providing such flows 
 
 
 
State building; distribution of authority 
State-society relations (e.g. political freedoms, 
citizenship rights) 
 
Resource exploitation strategies  
Distribution of profits and rents  
 
Distribution of access to energy services between 
different groups in society 
 
 
Energy generation & distribution infrastructure  
 
(2) A multi-layered system of 
mental conceptions 
 
2.1 Policy arguments 
 
 
 
2.2 Formalized rules & customary 
practices  
 
 
 
 
Proponents’ and opponents’ arguments (composed 
of: values, issue representations, goals, and 
means-goal arguments) 
 
Electricity system planning practices 
Project approval practices 
Processes to gain the acceptance of involuntary 
risk-bearers 
Project procurement (e.g. public-private 
partnerships) 
 
(3) Interaction between incumbents, 
and challengers 
Persuasiveness of policy argumentation 
 
Receptiveness of incumbents to reformist policy 
arguments  
 
Social mobilization to resist or support particular 
siting decisions or plans 
 
Source: authors. 
Table 1
Table 2 Myitsone project details 
 Details 
Location 
 
Approximately 25.71N, 97.49E (below 
confluence of N'Mai Hka and Mali Hka 
rivers) 
 
Dam dimensions 
139.5 m height 
1,310 m dam axis 
 Normal water level  245 m 
 Normal reservoir area 405 km
2
 
 Design head 155.3 m 
 Installed capacity 6,000 MW 
 Utilization hours 5144 
 Annual energy  30,864 GWh 
 
   Villages submerged 63 
 Affected population  11,807 
 Construction period 8 years 
   
Total investment cost USD 3.6 Billion  
Sunk cost as of 2012 USD 1.2 Billion  
Partnership Structure 
 
Build-Operate-
Transfer 
 
 
 
Equity Other benefits 
China Power Investment 
Corporation 80% 
 
 
Government of Myanmar 15% 
 
10% of electricity 
production free, 8% 
taxes 
 
Asia World Company 5% 
 Sources: Changjiang (2010), Interview M, Mizzima (2011) 
Table 2
Figure 1. Policy argument in favour of Myitsone dam and large hydropower 
 
Source: authors 
Figure 1
Figure 2. Policy argument against Myitsone dam 
 
Source: authors. 
Figure 2
Figure 3 Chibwe Creek dam and seven proposed upper Ayeyarwady projects 
  
Source: based on names and locations in KDNG (2007). Notes: In Kachin, May River is 
N’Mai Hka and Mali River is Mali Hka. 
 
Figure 3
